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I \ ! >unimm y ol Argumen t s 
The Appellant/Respondent (hereinafter the "Husband") alleges that the Protective 
* »nkir Mini issue il « fin I l a x i n b n I"1),
 1
I
"(IHI!,II I illiu AppelUv'IYlilionn (lu'iriiMl'li, I (lie 
"Wife") against the I lusband is improper for at least four reasons. First, the 1 lusband was 
denied due process in that he was not granted an opportunity to object to that ~-J~-
where il liiiJ I»tni lnuiiikiiiJ I- ()K \\ il,; |n ; \ u J lu, \ «p <ri Ji k <I u . J 
whicl 1 it originated on November 1 7, 2008. The Wife rebuts that her failure lu send a 
proposed order is not re\ersible error, and ihe differences between the oral and written 
™
A
 Marmiess error, i .^ iMMiui.^.vM'i.iivi.M:. v,uci .va-. i ,..;.. 
authorizes modification ol a protcc iuc order onl> after notice and a hearing*", regardless 
of whether those modifications are significant, both of whicl) the i lu.>baiid was denied. 
'I lie KCUINII i uiiMi mi Mn Prolcdivir ( hdiT is inipropu is llxratisf it \\ as issued III' i 
court commissioner with a mere ratification by a ji ldge; as the order w as broadened, it 
must be that insufficient judicial oversight was engaged in the issuance thereof. This is a 
v i () I a 11 o 11 o I K111 \' (> l u l l I 11 n I 111111 I i n I in I in. mi i V\ 111 in in I 11 I " i 11 1 1 1 I mi I K M I \ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 « II 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 and 
the performance of a non-delegable judicial act by an appointed commissioner. The Wife 
rebuts that what was issued at the November 17, 2008 hearing was actually a 
commissioner's recommendation, and. that as tl le I lusband did not object within the 10 
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recommendations, the Court was required to enter the Order because the Husband 
affirmatively waived his right to object. The Wife further alleges that the objections were 
not specifically and timely raised in the District Court. The Husband responds that the 
"grant" of an order issued at that hearing was not identified as a recommendation, nor 
was it treated by the Court as a recommendation, and further is nothing in the record to 
show that the Commissioner's order was reviewed by a judge, and the signatures of the 
judges appearing on the orders of Nov. 17 and Dec. 19 are mere ratifications prohibited 
by Holm v. Smilowitz 840 P.2d 157,160 (Utah 1992.) The Husband shows that his 
objections were timely, specifically and appropriately made, and regardless, the Court is 
required to provide judicial review even if no objections are filed under State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998.) 
The third reason the Protective Order is improper is that the process undertaken by 
the Commissioner and the District Court was not fundamentally fair, as required by Utah 
Code § 62A-4a-201(l)(a) when parental rights are involved. Judge Taylor summarily 
dismissed the Husband's motions to vacate that Protective Order and his objections 
thereto. 
The fourth reason the Protective Order is improper is that it was granted on 
insufficient grounds, because it relied on: (1) a plea of nolo contendere made in abeyance 
in violation of Rule 410 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, (2) an incorrect interpretation of 
an earlier protective order between the Husband and the Wife for which the Husband was 
found to have violated, and (3) an erroneous finding that the Husband had placed the 
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Wife in fear of domestic violence, for a purported invasion of her "personal space" and 
relying on a finding that the Husband's rebuttal was less credible than the Wife's 
allegations in the face of significant documentary evidence of domestic violence by the 
Wife supplied by the husband. The Wife rebuts that the Husband did not challenge the 
validity of the underlying protective order of June 11, 2008. The Husband replies that 
that order was stipulated to without a finding of fault, and provides no grounds for the 
issuance of a subsequent protective order. The Wife further rebuts (1) that the plea of 
nolo contendere was admissible evidence for analogous reasons as UCA § 77-36-1.1(3). 
The Husband responds that that section is expressly limited to penalty enhancements, and 
further that the Wife's position is contrary to D.A. v. State of Utah, 63 P.3d 607, 617 (Utah 
2002). The Wife further rebuts (2) and (3) that the trial court made detailed and well-
reasoned findings and further that the Husband failed to "marshal evidence" to show that 
he did not violate the protective order nor place the Wife in fear of imminent harm. The 
Husband responds that the burden of proof is on the Wife to show that the protective 
order was violated and that the Wife was placed in fear of domestic violence. The 
Husband further responds that the Court's interpretation of the protective order rendered 
the document self-conflicting, and that under the correct interpretation no violation 
occurred. The Husband further responds that neither the Court nor the Wife identified an 
event where the Wife was placed in actual fear of domestic violence. 
The Husband argues that the Protective Order was too broad. Utah Code § 78B-7-
106(3) authorizes "an order for protection", the provisions of which must serve to 
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reasonably protect a petitioner from a substantial and definite harm. The Husband 
showed that all and specific provisions of the Protective Order did not serve to prevent 
abuse or domestic violence. The Husband further argued that Utah Code § 62A-4a-
201(l)(a) "may not exceed the least restrictive means or alternatives available" was 
violated with respect to his parental rights. The Wife rebuts that the Husband's arguments 
are improper, and that Utah Code § 62A-4a-201(l)(a) was misread. The Wife then argues 
that because Utah Code § 78B-7-106(3) is constitutional citing State v. Hardy, 2002 UT 
App 244, 53 P.3d 645, and that under "similar reasoning", the Protective Order was not 
overbroad. The Husband replies that Hardy actually reinforces his position, because it 
states that with regard to particular protective orders, in the absence of previous instances 
of domestic violence or abuse, or a substantial likelihood thereof, "the court may not 
restrict the protective order respondent's right". 
Finally, the Husband petitioned for a protective order against the Wife. The 
District Court erroneously dismissed that petition under Utah Code § 78B-7-108 without 
the required due process hearing. The Husband showed that the Wife's assaults were 
made in other than self-defense, and the Husband is entitled to a protective order under 
Utah Code § 78B-7-103. The Wife rebuts that the Husband did not file a request for a 
protective order under a separate case number. The Husband responds that § 78B-7-108 
requires only an independent petition, not an independent case, which he met. 
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V. Argument 
A. Rebuttal to the Appellee1 s Argument 
1. The Husband Objected to the Issuance of the Protective Orders, and Preserved the 
Issues for Appeal 
a. The Husband timely objected to the Commissioner's order. 
The Wife repeatedly argues that the order orally issued by Commissioner Patton 
from the bench on November 17, 2008 was a commissioner's recommendation, and Rule 
7(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the Husband's objections after ten 
days. That is incorrect for several reasons. 
First, the order of November 17, 2008 was not a recommendation, nor is there 
anything in the record that appears that could possibly be a recommendation. The 
District Court did not identify the order of Nov. 17 as a recommendation, but rather as a 
grant (Appellant's brief, pg. 24, 2nd paragraph: "I'm granting your client a protective 
order" (Ex. M pg. 3 fourth full paragraph), "the Court grants the Protective Order." (Ex. 
H pgs. 2&4.)) Nothing issued by the Court is identified as a "recommendation", and the 
word "recommend" does not appear in any paper issuing from the Court, nor any form of 
that word. 
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Furthermore, the Court did not treat that Order as a recommendation. There is 
nothing in the record that shows that the Judge Taylor, for the oral order of Nov. 17, nor 
Judge Laycock, for the written order of Dec. 19, 2008, did anything but simply sign and 
ratify. The record shows that the order of Nov. 17 was ratified by Judge Taylor in a 
minute entry in case no. 084400917 (Ex. H, pg. 2), that ratification on the page bearing 
the date of Nov. 21, 2008, four days after the hearing. That minute entry states that "the 
Court grants the Protective Order". Therefore, it is clear from the record that the District 
Court did not give the Husband 10 days to object to a recommendation, as would have 
been required under URCP 7(g), and therefore even the Court did not consider the 
Commissioner's oral order to be a recommendation. 
There is nothing to show that any judicial officer performed any review of the 
record to consider the propriety of the orders issued. In fact, record shows that at least 
for the written order of Dec. 19, an insufficient review was made because of the several 
enlargements in that order. (Appellant's brief pgs. 27 and 23.) 
Contrary to what the Wife claims, the Husband does not concede that he did not 
file an objection within ten days of a commissioner's recommendation, because no 
recommendation was issued by the Commissioner. Regardless, the Husband has shown 
that he took all reasonable steps to be timely in making his objections. (Appellant's brief, 
pgs 25-26.) The Wife points to Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.3 (renumbered to 78B-7-107 in 
2008) and URCP 7(g) to argue that the Husband was not timely. However, neither that 
rule nor that statute prohibits objections made after the 10-day period, but merely provide 
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a sanctioned method of making an objection. The principles of fairness and due process 
would require that application of a time period be preceded by notice to the affected 
party, and here the Court did not inform the Husband that a recommendation was being 
made. The Wife's interpretation of Buck v. Robinson (2008 UT App 28) is incorrect; that 
only spoke to the constitutionality of the statutes and rules regarding court 
commissioners, and does not show that a Judge is required to enter a final judgment from 
a commissioner's recommendation if an objection is not timely made. Thus, even if the 
order of Nov. 17 was a commissioner's recommendation, the Wife's arguments of 
untimeliness are misplaced. 
Regardless of whether an objection is made, a judge is required to exercise judicial 
power for any core judicial function. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998.) In that 
case, the Utah Supreme Court restated that core judicial functions include "the power to 
hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation" and 
further that "core judicial functions do not include functions that are generally designed 
to 'assist' courts, such as conducting fact finding hearings, holding pretrial conferences, 
and making recommendations to judges. In these instances, the commissioners' actions 
are reviewable by a judge; thus, ultimate judicial power remains with the judge." (Id. pg. 
302, citing Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 884 (Utah 1994.)) To hear and determine a 
controversy requires the taking, reviewing, and deciding on the evidence presented, and 
commissioners may constitutionally make recommendations precisely for the reason that 
they are to be reviewed by a judge. The presence of the signature of a judge appearing on 
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the orders is not sufficient; this Court has ruled that the ratification by a judge of a 
commissioner's order while relying on the commissioner's discretion is an impermissible 
delegation of judicial power. {Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 R2d 157, 168.) The Husband has 
shown that at least Judge Laycock did not review the final written order, as evidenced by 
the at least seven discrepancies within. (Appellant's brief pgs. 27 and 23.) It is clearly 
apparent that Utah Code § 78B-7-107 in 2008 and URCP 7(g) exist so that a respondent 
will be provided an opportunity to apprise a judge of the controversies remaining at the 
time a commissioner's recommendation is made, allowing the judge to provide the 
judicial review required by State v. Thomas. Judge Taylor was not present at the Nov. 
17th hearing, and he did not "hear" the controversy, nor did he hear the Husband's 
objections prior to the application of his signature stamp four days later. The Husband 
was not accorded an opportunity to object to the grounds stated by the Commissioner in 
the Nov. 17th hearing until well after Judge Taylor applied his signature. Furthermore, 
the only acts that appear in the record by a judge are the application of the signature 
stamps of Judges Taylor and Laycock on the orders of May 13, Nov. 17 and Dec. 19, 
2008, and there is nothing in the record that shows that any judge reviewed any of the 
evidence presented, Commissioner Patton's acts, or the grounds therefor as required by 
State v. Thomas. 
As to the Wife's footnote quotation in Thomas v. Thomas, 2004 UT App 440, the 
text continues "we need not decide that issue today", and has no precedential value. 
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Furthermore, the Wife admits that the Husband's objections were filed, and therefore he 
cannot be deemed to have affirmatively waived his defenses. 
b. The Husband preserved the issues for appeal. 
The Wife claims that the objections filed by the Husband on January 8, 2009 were 
inoperative as an objection to the Commissioner's "recommendation" because (1) they 
were untimely, (2) they were "a generalized objection to the format of the final protective 
order and other grievances", and (3) impliedly the Wife alleges that effective objections 
were not elsewhere raised, referring to criteria one and two of the test in Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co. (966 P.2d 844, 847). The issue of timeliness is addressed above; the 
Husband cannot be held to a ten-day time period where he was not given notice of a 
commissioner's recommendation, and furthermore he requested waiver of the ten-day rule 
on several grounds (Ex. M, pgs. 1&2, Appellant's brief, pg. 26.) 
The Husband met criteria one of the Badger test. The Husband did not have the 
content of the oral order until he received an audio recording of the Court, which for 
unknown reasons required the District Court more than one week to produce to the 
Husband. The minute entries of the Nov. 17 hearing differ substantially from what was 
actually stated by the Commissioner at the hearing (Appellant's Brief, pg. 23, Ex. L, pg. 
2.) Therefore, in order to make his objections, the Husband needed to transcribe the 
recording so he could refer to the text of the original oral order in making his objections 
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on paper, as a written form containing the accurate specifics of the order of Nov. 17 was 
not produced by the Court. Furthermore, at the Nov. 17th hearing the Commissioner 
stated grounds for the protective order that had not been previously pleaded nor argued, 
and the Husband was also placed in a position of responding to those. The Husband was 
in the process of preparing his motions containing his objections when the written order 
of December 19th was served upon him on December 30th, and the Husband filed his 
objections as rapidly as he could to both the oral and the written orders within 10 days of 
that service, including the objections to the enlargements the following day. The 
Husband's objections were delayed by both the trial court in inaccurately recording the 
order in the minutes and in processing delays in providing the audio recording of the 
hearing, and by the Wife in waiting for more than 40 days to file and serve the written 
form of the protective order. Furthermore, the District Court held a hearing in response 
to the Husband's motions and objections on Feb. 13, and did not strike nor object to the 
Husband's motions as untimely. Furthermore, the Husband's motions (Exs. J-N) were 
filed within the time limits prescribed by Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Husband submits that the objections were raised in a timely manner, and 
that any delays introduced were substantially the responsibility of others. 
The Wife then claims that the Husband "didn't object with specificity to the 
Commissioner's recommendation that a permanent protective order enter", in reference to 
the second criteria of Badger. The Wife's argument plainly mischaracterizes the paper of 
January 8 as objecting only to the "format" and the "Commissioner's authority", and fails 
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to genuinely identify any issue that is claimed not to be raised. The Husband did not 
object to the "Commissioner's recommendation", because none was made, as shown 
above. The Husband took care to identify where the issues presented were raised in the 
record in his brief, in the section entitled "V. Statement of the Issues and Standard of 
Review." The Husband objected in the January 8 paper, "Respondent now objects to the 
issuance of the protective orders issued from November to the present time ..." (Ex. M 
pg. 4) for the reasons that "the grounds for issuing a protective order are defective and 
insufficient" and stating his objections with specificity (pgs. 10-17). In his Motion to 
Vacate Protective Orders of December 30, the Husband objected to and requested 
vacation of the permanent protective order on the grounds that Commissioner Patton 
lacked authority to issue that order under UJCRJA 6-401(4). (Ex. J pgs. 2 & 3.) 
The Wife then argues that the Husband should have waited for the trial court to 
rule on the objections made Jan. 8 before filing a notice of appeal. As the Husband has 
shown, the trial court issued a final order, orally stated, on November 17 and recorded on 
November 21, 2008. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure specifies that if an 
appeal is to be taken as a matter of right, it must be filed "within 30 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or the order appealed from"; the Husband filed his notice of appeal 
within that 30-day period from the entry of that final order. Nothing in the rules required 
the Husband to "wait for the trial court to rule on this objection before filing his Notice of 
Appeal", and if the Husband had waited as the Wife suggests, then this appeal could not 
be taken as a matter of right. The delays in the filings preserving the issues are not the 
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Husband's responsibility, and the Wife cannot show any prejudicial effect of the times in 
which the objections were made. The Husband is not limited in this appeal to only the 
issues stated in the record at the time he filed his notice of appeal, and challenges to 
subsequent actions by the Court in the same matter can and should be heard by this Court 
in the interest of judicial economy. 
2. The Husband was Denied Due Process by the Trial Court. 
The Wife then argues that the Husband was not denied due process, because (1) he 
was not entitled to receive a copy of the broadened written protective order of December 
21, 2008 before it was signed, (2) the Commissioner's lack of authority in the issuance of 
the protective order is not "reversible error", and (3) Utah Code § 62A-4a-201(l) does 
not apply. The Wife then claims that the Husband did not meet his obligations to state his 
contentions and reasons with necessary citations under the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(9), Huish v. Munro (2008 UT App 283) and State v. Garner (2002 UT 
App 234). Yet, the Wife was able to make a response to the Husband's contentions and 
reasoning. Even so, the Husband now replies with reference to the citations made, so as 
to challenge this claim. 
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a. The Husband was denied due process by not being afforded an opportunity to obiect to 
the enlargements in the written protective order of Dec. 19, 2008. 
Although the Wife argues otherwise, the written protective order of Dec. 19 was 
significantly enlarged. Utah Code § 78B-7-106(3) authorizes a modification of a 
protective order only "after notice and a hearing". That section does not distinguish 
between significant and insignificant modifications, as the Wife claims. Rather, that 
section applies to any modification to the scope of a protective order, including 
modifications made in the production of a written version from an oral one. The 
Husband was not provided with notice nor a hearing as required by the statute, rather the 
written protective order was served upon him without any opportunity to review and 
object. The enlargements were briefed in reference to Ex. L, the Respondent's Objections 
filed Dec. 31st, specifically referring to the enlargements on listed in that exhibit on page 
two that include lack of telephone visitation with the Husband's children, lack of contact 
with the Petitioner for mediation, and a vague order to "provide support to family" not 
present in the oral order. This argument is stated on pages 22 and 23 of the Appellant's 
brief, and in reference to these facts, the statute and Mathews v. Eldridge, it is 
indisputable that the Husband was denied his due process rights of being heard in 
opposition with "notice and a hearing" to those enlargements as required by Utah Code § 
78B-7-106(3). Those modifications are not "harmless" as the Wife claims in reference to 
State v. Spillars, as any difference to the scope of the final protective order issuing would 
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be be an effect in the outcome of the proceedings. Reversal is an appropriate remedy, 
particularly where the Wife failed to constrain herself to the order from the bench and 
further because she failed to avail herself of the procedures available by Rule 7(f)(2) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to ensure there was no discrepancy in the final order. 
b. The Husband was denied due process by not being afforded judicial review of the 
Commissioner's order. 
The Wife then argues that the Husband was not denied due process because Judge 
Taylor signed the Nov. 17, 2008 minute entry and because Judge Laycock signed the 
written order of Dec. 19, 2008. The Wife then argues that this was proper procedure for 
the Court, and that the issuance of these orders should be affirmed. The Husband has 
shown above that these signature were mere ratifications prohibited by Holm v. 
Smilowitz. 
The Wife then argues that the Court had no affirmative obligation to inform him 
that the order of Nov. 17th was a commissioner's recommendation. The Wife also argues 
that the Husband should have known that the order of Nov. 17th was actually a 
recommendation, because he is legally trained. 
This is simply not a credible argument. In essence, the Wife argues that under the 
facts and the record at the time, the Husband should have known that the order of Nov. 
17th was actually a recommendation. As shown above, the Court did not identify the 
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order of Nov. 17, 2008 as a commissioner's recommendation in any way, and in fact it 
characterized the order as a "grant". Also shown above, Commissioner Patton and Judge 
Taylor did not consider that order a recommendation, because the word "recommend" or 
it's like was not used, and further Judge Taylor signed the order four days later, well in 
advance of the time that the Husband's objections would have been due. If the 
Commissioner and the Judge could not tell that that order was a recommendation, they 
being lawyers having many years of legal experience, how can it be expected that the 
Husband, never having practiced law before a Utah court, was to identify that the order 
was a recommendation? 
However, this point is moot, because even if the Husband had an obligation to 
object under URCP 7(g), the Court would still have had an obligation to provide review 
of a commissioner's recommendation by a judicial officer capable of exercising core 
judicial functions, which the Husband has shown did not occur. State v. Thomas. 
c. The Husband was denied due process by not being afforded a fundamentally fair 
process under Utah Code § 62A-4a-201(l)(a) when parental interests are involved. 
Appellant showed in his brief on page 28 that he was entitled to a fundamentally 
fair process as the parent of his children with whom his parental interests were curtailed 
by the protective orders, and argued that he was entitled to judical review and 
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consideration of his arguments, evidence, motions and the orders issuing from the Court. 
This point is unchallenged by the Wife. 
3. The Grounds for the Protective Orders were Inadequate. 
The Wife then argues that the Husband fails to "question the validity of the 
issuance of the underlying protective order". Although this argument is not clear, it is 
apparent that what the Wife claims is that because the validity of the prior "underlying" 
protective order dated June 11, 2008 (Ex. H) was not challenged, the Husband is 
precluded from challenging any subsequent protective order. 
However, the protective order dated June 11, 2008, prepared by the Wife's 
attorney, carries the following language: "The parties expressed their desire to attempt 
reconciliation and the parties' stipulation anticipated that result. Pursuant to the 
stipulation, the Court accepted and entered the parties' stipulation without a finding of 
fault or an admission or finding of wrongdoing against the Respondent." (Ex. H, pg. 2.) 
The minute entry of May 13, 2008 states that "As per the stipulation the modified ex 
parte temporary protective order is to remain in full force and effect without a finding of 
fault until September 22, 2008 at 10:00 am. The Court instructs Mr. Bartholomew to 
prepare a modified ex parte temporary protective order without a finding of fault." (See 
the Appendix to this Brief.) The Husband does not challenge the underlying order, 
because it was made by stipulation and without findings of fault. The protective orders 
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challenged were issued on findings independent of the "underlying" protective order, 
stated for the first time at the November 17, 2008 hearing. The Commissioner's grounds 
for the protective orders of Nov. 17 and Dec. 21 did not rely on an earlier protective 
order, nor any prior stated grounds. The Wife's objections provide no valid ground for 
the disregarding of the Husband's arguments, 
a. The plea in abeyance of no contest was inadmissible. 
The Wife cites to UCA § 77-36-1.1(3) to show that a plea of no contest in a 
domestic offense is equivalent of a conviction. However, the very language quoted by 
the Wife restricts that equivalence "For the purposes of this section". The heading on that 
section is "Enhancement of offense and penalty for subsequent domestic violence 
offenses", and concerns only the penalties for a conviction of domestic violence. That 
section does not authorize a court to generally equate a plea-in-abeyance to a conviction 
or render that as admissible evidence otherwise. This section is not "closely analogous" 
as the Wife claims. Those contexts are completely different, as the context of Rule 410 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence concerns the determination of findings of fact, and Utah 
Code § 77-36-1.1 concerns the determination of penalties after findings of fact are made, 
and is expressly limited to that purpose. 
Although the section cited by the Wife is not applicable, this Utah Supreme Court 
has ruled on this issue. In DA. v. State of Utah, cited by the Appellant in his brief, this 
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Court adopted reasoning of the federal courts with respect to pleas of nolo contendere. 
(63 P.3d 607, 617 (Utah 2002), referring to Olsen v. Corriero, 189 R3d 52 (1st Cir. 
1999.)) Olsen states: "... a nolo plea is not a factual admission that the pleader committed 
a crime. Rather, it is a statement of unwillingness to contest the government's charges 
and an acceptance of the punishment that would be meted out to a guilty person. ... 
Throughout it's history ... the plea of nolo contendere has been viewed not as an express 
admission of guilt but as a consent by the defendant that he may be punished as if he 
were guilty and a prayer for leniency." (id. at 60.) "Unlike a plea of guilty, however, [a 
nolo plea] cannot be used against a defendant as an admission in a subsequent criminal or 
civil case ... A defendant who desires to plead nolo contendere will commonly want to 
avoid pleading guilty because the plea of guilty can be introduced as an admission in 
subsequent civil litigation." (id. at 60.) 
The Wife argues that a plea of "no contest - plea in abeyance" is not the same as a 
plea of "nolo contendere." However, if the District Court were allowed to accept pleas in 
abeyance of nolo contendere into evidence in subsequent cases, that would destroy the 
purpose expressed in DA. and Olsen, as there would be no advantage to a defendant in 
making that plea over a plea of guilty in a plea in abeyance. A Utah court accepted the 
Husband's plea of nolo contendere, and the Utah District Court here should respect the 
bargain that was made with the Husband that the charges against him would not be used 
as proof of wrongdoing, domestic violence or otherwise, in a subsequent civil action. 
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Commissioner Patton used the existence of a plea-in-abeyance as the needed proof 
"that domestic violence or abuse has occurred" as required in Utah Code § 78B-7-106. 
(Appellant's brief, pgs. 30-31.) Commissioner Patton's assessment fails to consider that 
the plea entered could be that of nolo contendere, and under Rule 410 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence and DA. v. State of Utah, the existence of a plea in abeyance agreement 
does not prove the underlying allegations of domestic violence or abuse, particularly 
where the defendant did not plead guilty. 
b. The prior ex-parte protective order was not violated, and the Husband did not place 
the Wife in fear of imminent harm. 
The Wife then argues that the Husband has not met his burden to show that 
Commissioner Patton was wrong in his assessment that he violated the modified ex-parte 
protective order of June 11, 2008 (Ex. C), arguing that the Husband needs to reference 
authority to support his position, and that he fails to marshal evidence in disputation. 
The Husband marshaled the protective order itself (Ex. C) and a transcription of 
the portion of the November 17th hearing in which the finding was made (Ex. M, pgs. 2-
3 and 11.) These were referenced in Respondent's brief on pages 31-34 in his argument, 
and the portion of the transcript was quoted by the Appellee in her brief on page 13. The 
Wife does not dispute the accuracy of these, and this Court has the case record that 
includes the transcription for verification. The Wife seems to argue that a statement of 
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"authority" is needed, such as caselaw. However, here the dispute concerns the 
interpretation of a non-standard, stipulated and negotiated provision in a protective order, 
and it is unreasonable for the Wife to require that the Husband find some comparable 
language in the caselaw. The evidence to be marshalled is intrinsic to the protective order 
itself, particularly where the Husband claims that the Commissioner's interpretation 
would render the document inconsistent with itself, as he has so argued. 
In the light most favorable to the District Court, the Commissioner's interpretation 
of provision 3 that u[the Respondent] cannot interfere with her use, control and 
possession ... because that's what she was granted" is presumed to be correct. As the 
Husband showed, that interpretation cannot be correct, because it renders the additional 
language of provision three surplusage: ("The Respondent shall not interfere with 
Petitioner's use of said property, but is not prohibited from a non interfering use. The 
intent of this provision is to allow the Respondent to continue to care for the parties' 
property, participate in family events at the home and other circumstances as mutually 
agreed upon by the parties.") The Husband also showed that the Commissioner's 
interpretation cannot be correct, because it conflicts with the language regarding parent 
time in provision five: "As the Respondent is not presently ordered to "stay away" from 
the parties' home, his parent-time with the children shall be while he is at the home seeing 
to the property's maintenance, family events and as otherwise agreed upon by the 
parties'." The Wife's allegations were that the Husband was present at the house against 
her wishes, and the Commissioner's finding that he was in violation of the protective 
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order by his presence at the home without mutual agreement was dependent upon the 
interpretation that mutual agreement was necessary, which interpretation has been shown 
to be false. This is all explained in the Appellant's brief on pages 31-34, and reliance 
upon a clearly conflicting interpretation is clear abuse of discretion under Uintah Basin 
Medical Center v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15. The Husband marshaled the evidence required, 
and Wife's claims are in error. 
The Wife then argues that the Husband has not met his burden to show that the 
Commissioner's reasoning regarding placing his wife in fear of imminent harm is 
incorrect. The Husband cited to the transcript in Exhibit M. As the Husband pointed out 
in his brief on page 34, the Commissioner did not point to an event of such. The Wife 
attempts to shift the burden of proof away from herself, and force the Husband to prove 
the negative. If the Commissioner's reasoning regarding imminent harm were valid, the 
Wife could simply point to a supporting event in the record and rebut the Husband's 
contention. The Wife's burden of proof is light, but still she fails to show that she was 
actually placed in fear of imminent harm, and fails to show that she even made such an 
allegation. This Court should conclude that the Commissioner's finding with respect to 
placing the Wife in fear of domestic violence is unsupported and not a proper ground for 
the issuance of a protective order. 
None of the Commissioner's grounds for issuing a protective order withstand 
scrutiny, and this Court should rule them to be insufficient and the findings that domestic 
violence or abuse have occurred or were likely are unsupported in fact. 
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4. The Protective Orders were Overbroad. 
The Wife then argues that the Husband's arguments are based on a misreading of 
UCA § 62A-4a-201(l)(b) and the Cohabitant Abuse Act, but fails to explain what is 
misread or in error. The Wife then argues that the Husband has not marshalled evidence 
nor presented argument that the trial court's findings were erroneous, despite the 
Appellant's extensive and complete treatment of the supporting findings from pages 29 to 
39 of his brief. Neither of these claims is supported in fact. Again, the Wife attempts to 
shift the burden of proof to the Husband to show a negative; that he did not commit 
domestic violence or abuse. It is the Petitioner/Appellee's burden to show that domestic 
violence or abuse occurred, or is substantially likely to occur. Utah Code § 78B-7-
103(1). 
The Wife then argues that the protective order statute is constitutional, citing State 
v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, 53 P.3d 645, and then offers explanations of why the 
protective order statute has been sufficiently narrowly drafted. However the Husband did 
not claim that the statute was unconstitutional. The Husband argued that the protective 
orders of November 17 and December 19, 2008 were broader than what Utah Code 
§§ 78B-7-106(3) and 62A-4a-201(l)(b) authorized. Reciting the initial arguments in 
Appellant's brief, page 40: Utah Code § 78B-7-106(3) is the statute enabling a court to 
issue a permanent protective order, which authorizes "an order for protection". Thus, by 
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the statute's very language, the order must serve to protect a petitioner from a substantial 
and definite potential harm of abuse or domestic violence for the protection of herself and 
the named children. The Wife's quotation of State v. Hardy on page 15 of her brief 
contains the following: 'Without the particular relationship of "cohabitants" and without 
previous instances or the "substantial likelihood" of domestic violence or abuse, the court 
may not restrict the protective order respondent's right to speak and associate freely' 
because 'it is narrowly drafted to "burden no more speech than necessary to serve a 
significant government interest.'" Hardy illustrates the Husband's argument precisely: the 
statute is constitutional because it limits the restrictions that can be placed on a protective 
order respondent's rights to the restrictions that can be shown to serve the governmental 
interest of protecting the health and well-being of its citizens. A court does not have full 
discretion to order any protective order desired; a protective order that issues must be 
bounded to that which provides some protective purpose as shown by the evidence 
proffered. See also Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34 and Strollo v. Strollo, 828 P2d 532, 
referenced in the Appellant's brief at page 40. 
The Wife offers no argument that a protective order can be issued beyond what is 
needed for a petitioner's protection, and fails to counter the reasoning stated in the 
Appellant's brief on pages 40-44 that specific orders do not protect the Wife from 
domestic violence or abuse, or a substantial likelihood thereof If there were such 
reasoning, the Wife could simply point to the record showing previous instances or the 
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substantial likelihood of domestic violence or abuse under the standard in Hardy, but fails 
to do so. 
5. The Husband is Entitled to a Protective Order. 
The Wife then argues that the Husband is not entitled to a protective order because 
he "never filed his own, separate request for protective order under a separate case 
number", with reference to UCA § 78B-7-108 requiring the filing of an independent 
petition. That statute requires only an independent petition, not an independent case. The 
Husband filed an independent petition on September 18, 2008 (Ex. G) which was well in 
advance of the November 17th hearing. The Husband filed his petition in the same case 
because the set of facts presented in rebuttal to his wife's petition were substantially the 
same, and Husband filed his petition in the same case for the purpose of the convenience 
of the District Court. The Husband was entitled to have his petition heard and ruled 
upon. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Appellant maintains his requests made in his earlier brief. 
Everett D. Robinson 
ProSe 
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As per the stipulation the modified ex parte temporary protective 
order is to remain in full force and effect without a finding of 
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Page 1 
31 
Case No: 084400917 
Date: May 13, 2008 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 09/22/2008 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Third floor, Rm 303 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
125 N 100 W 
PROVO, UT 84601 
Commissioner: THOMAS PATTON 
m 13 
In c ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ g ^ S ^ } ^ t h e Americans wit^DiP^jbiT^^^s^JKct,' ' iridI viaua 1 s 
needing^sg^jg^Wgccommodations (includ&a^^elwlsi^^y communicative 
aids and services) should call TERI at {§&l?Wl*fHll2 at least three 
working days prior to the proceeding. (For TTY service call Utah 
Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711) The general information phone 
number is (801)429-1000. 
Page 2 (last) 
32 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the attached Reply Brief of the Appellant was served upon the 
following parties listed below by mailing it by first class mail, personal delivery, or fax to 
the following addresses: 
Name: Jody G. Robinson, Petitioner 
Address: as represented by Patricia K Abbott, Esq. 
455 North University Avenue, Suite 100 
Provo, UT 84601 
Sent Via: 
)S Mail (postage prepaid) 
Personal Delivery 
Fax# 
Name: Kelly Fry Glasser, Esq. 
Address: Office of the Guardian ad Litem, Fourth District 
32 West Center Street, Suite 205 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Sent Via: 
kj Mail (postage prepaid) 
Personal Delivery 
Fax# 
By: 
Date: 
Everett D. Robinson 
P.O. Box 1047 
American Fork, UT 84003 
(801)-649-5858 
33 
